Gabucio CF

Language: Spanish
References: 5
Page: 120-123
PDF size: 75.25 Kb.

ABSTRACT

This work argues against Pardos’ proposal according to which the extension of the classical notion of mental images, including also sound images, could be the way to incorporate language as stuff of thinking (2017). First of all, the extensive historical reconstruction developed to support his thesis is unnecessary unless the primary goal of the thesis was to defend the character of mental images as a basic and unavoidable stuff of thinking. Secondly, language is considered a proper psychological subject from a long time ago; and no matter what theoretical position is adopted, it is doubtful to believe that language can be understood in all its complexity only from the point of view of mental images (even if these include sound images). Lastly, we all are in debt with Vygotsky for his specific hypothesis that sees language as a semiotic system that makes possible the emergence of inner speech as a singularly human way of thinking and it seems to me that this is the ultimate thesis that the author defends (Pardos, 2017).

REFERENCES

1. Mendelsund, P. (2015). Qué vemos cuando leemos. Barcelona: Seix Barral (ed. original de 2014).

2. Pardos, A. (2005). Unidad básica de la psicología. Barcelona: impreso

3. por Format Digital, S. L.

4. ——. (2017). Las imágenes en el pensamiento. Revista Mexicana de Investigación en Psicología, 9(2), 87-102.

5. Vygotsky, L. S. (1995 [1956]). Pensamiento y lenguaje. Teoría del desarrollo cultural de las funciones psíquicas. (Trad.: Ma. M. Rotger). Buenos Aires: Ediciones Fausto. (Trabajo original publicado en 1956). Recuperado el 14 de abril de 2012, de http://www.taringa.net/perfil/vygotsky