2023, Number 4
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Rev Elec Psic Izt 2023; 26 (4)
The ethical training of health professionals and the status of moral emotions in the vitalist ethics
Herrera SF
Language: Spanish
References: 18
Page: 1336-1358
PDF size: 265.46 Kb.
ABSTRACT
The ethical training of health professionals involves a double
process: the construction of the professional identity as an exercise
of autonomy and the foundation of the professional identity as the
building of the moral person. Autonomy as
self-modeling calls for the
development of specific capacities for: self-government, selfknowledge,
self-control, the development and exercise of which
entails the identification, recognition and rational management or
mastery of our "
moral emotions", a task that must be faced
systematically first on a conceptual level, under a knowledge of
various ethical approaches, to later situate those elements that
guide our professional work in the field of health. This study
evaluates the status of "moral emotions" in the context of vitalist
ethics, taking Nietzsche's philosophical proposal as a specific case
and briefly examining two of the important passions for him: joy as
gai savoir and love, as
love fati, as a specific contribution to the
general task of formulating a general theory of emotions and
contributing elements to the ethical training of health professionals.
It is concluded that the
gai savoir allows an attitudinal positioning as
a jovial attitude: a mixture of carelessness, irreverence, daring, joy
and malice when confronting the object of knowledge. For its part,
love fati enables a strong personal identity, as it is a way of
recognizing and accepting oneself in one's
fatum, one's destiny, as
a full acceptance of life, including pain.
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